Supermarket Development in China by German, Gene A. et al.
••••
E.B.96-20December 1996 
Cornell 
Food 
Industry 
Management 
Program 
Supermarket Development
 
in China
 
o
 
I I 
I \
 
••tlJlIttl 
!£JUi..tl.jfj/\mf!l! 
IMMII:.:Il~S3"'I'.=.ooo.=........c..........-..............l...~
 
1:.1Ulrj[] • ~
.11.J:tli1lUll 
~lI~z:+~: 
ll:iIllftl"'er£.1. 
RG f\§f!I!l 
•• ~ ...J1tlltlJ!
~S3~1E.;j< 
811-fl8;c( 
WII-Man1t& •. 
.la1l8 *tlJ 8\ 
lta• .IItlJ •• 
flit'" 7I.1I1!!l+1 
super Shenzhen 
.set for opeJ!tng 
JAPANESE retail giant 
Yaohan will open its first 
joint-venture supermarket 
in China tomorrow. the first 
of 1,000 planned by chair­
man Kazuo Wada for the 
world's 1arJest market. 
"Our initial plan is to 
open five or six in Shanghai 
by the end ofthis year." said 
Zhou &zhon&. head of the 
aeneral manager's office at 
Shanghai Lian Nong Co. 
Yaoban's partner. 
Yaoh 
f 
; 
Gene A. German
 
Jane Wu
 
Ming Li Chai
 
Food Industry Management Program
 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics
 
College of Agriculture and Life Sciences
 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853
 
It is the Policy ofCornell University actively to support equality 
of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be 
denied admission to any educational program or activity or be 
denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited I 
discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, 
color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, &eX, age or 
handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of laffirmative action programs which will assure the continuation of 
such equality of opportunity. 
Supermarket Development
 
in China
 
Gene A. German
 
Jane Wu
 
Ming Li Chai
 
Cornell University
 
Food Industry Management Program
 
$25 per copy
 
Copies may be purchased from:
 
Food Industry Management Program
 
113 Warren Hall
 
Cornell University
 
Ithaca, NY 14853-7801 ­
Phone (607) 255-1622 
Fax (607) 255-4776 
Acknowledgments 
The authors would like to express their appreciation to the Food Marketing Institute for 
providing a portion of the funding for this project. Also, our thanks to Vitasoy International for its 
financial support and to Winston Lo, President of Vitasoy, for his advice and insights regarding the 
China market. 
We are grateful to Peter Weldon and Stephen Watt of the Survey Research Group of Hong 
Kong and China for their assistance in providing retail census data. 
A special thanks to Mike Milligan, Tom Muccio, Stephen Goodroe and especially to Andy 
Jett, all of Procter and Gamble, for their assistance in providing special insights into the distribution 
system of the China market. 
We would also like to express our appreciation to the many retail companies that provided 
information used in this report: Mr. Hiroaki Kawai, Yoohan International Holdings Ltd.' Mr. He 
Xiang Dong and George Lu of China Resources Supermarket Ltd.; Mr. Che Wan Cheng, Xiamen 
Yibai Department Store Co.; Mr. Liu Zhan Peng, Guangdong Foods Company; Mr. Zhao A. Long, 
Shanghai Lian Hua Supermarket Co.; Mr. Liang Dong, Xiamen Foreign Supply Corp.; and Mr. He 
Dechao, Foshan Xinghua Group. 
We were also provided with special insights from a number of Chinese government 
officials which proved to be extremely helpful in developing a perspective on government 
regulations regarding the supermarket industry. We are grateful to the following government 
officials: Mr. Huang Hai, Ministry of Internal Trade, Beijing, Mr. Lee Shu Xiang, Shanghai City 
Government; Mr. Scott Reynolds, USDA Agricultural Trade Office, Beijing; and Mr. Wayne 
Molstad, USDA Agricultural Trade Office, Guangzhou. 
•
 
Table of Contents
 
Introduction
 1 
Population
 1 
Historical Overview................................................................................................................. 1
 
Trends in the 90's 2
 
Economy 2
 
Growth and Development...... 2
 
Per-capita Income 3
 
Components of Expenditure.................................................................................................... 5
 
The New Wealthy and Purchasing Power 5
 
The New Economic Zones -- Windows to the Outside World 7
 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 7
 
Open Coastal Cities 7
 
Open Coastal Economic Areas 8
 
Pudong New Development Area 8
 
Free Trade Zones (FTZs)............................................. 9
 
Other Economic Zones............................. 9
 
Supermarket Development in China 12
 
Supermarkets in China 12
 
Stages of Development 13
 
1981-1985: Introduction 13
 
1986-1990: Decline 14
 
1991-1992: Reintroduction 16
 
1993: Adjustment Stage 16
 
1994-1995: Growth Stage 17
 
Supermarket Development in Three Key Regions of China 17
 
Southern China--Guangzhou and Shenzhen 17
 
The Strong Influence from Hong Kong 17
 
Supermarket Development has been Strongly Influenced •
 
by Foreign Investment 17
 
Positioning Themselves as High Class Shopping Centers 18
 
Little Government Restrictions or Support : 18
 
Strong Economy 18
 
iii 
Northern China--Beijing 18
 
Laissez-Faire 18
 
Many Well-Operated Local Supennarkets 18
 
Many Foreign Joint Venture Supennarkets 18
 
Middle China--Shanghai
 19
 
Guidelines and Policies for Supporting Supennarket Development
 
in Shanghai 19
 
Supporting Policies for Supennarket Development.. 20
 
National Government Incentives
 21 
The Introduction of Foreign Investment 22
 
A Summary of the Operational Performance of Supermarkets In China 23
 
Methodology 23
 
Supennarket Size 23
 
Number of Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) 24
 
Supennarket Sales 24
 
Gross Margins 24
 
Expenses 24
 
Net Profit After Tax 25
 
Supennarket Operating Costs 25
 
Grocery Buying and Reordering 25
 
Capital Component 25
 
A Summary of Retail Census Analysis of Four Major Cities in China 25
 
Issues Facing Supermarket Development in China 26
 
L.ack of Capital for Expansion 26
 
Hard to Find Store Locations 28
 
Poor Return on Investment 28
 
L.ack of Management Know-How 28
 
L.ack of Product Variety 28
 
Ineffective Buying Practices 29
 
Inefficient Distribution and Unreliable Delivery 29
 
L.ack of Effective Inventory Management 29
 
Learning How to Manage a Market Driven Business 30
 
Shoplifting 30 •
 
Competition From Traditional Food Outlets 30
 
The Prospects and Recommendations for Future Supermarket Development ... 30
 
End Notes
 33
 
iv
 
List of Tables
 
Table 1:	 National Income, Index of National Income and National Income Growth 
(1978-1993) 3
 
Table 2:	 Annual Per-Capita Income of Rural and Urban Residents 
(1978-1993) 4
 
Table 3: Total and Per Capita Saving Deposit Balances of Chinese Residents
 
(1978-1993) 4
 
Table 4: 1993 Annual Per-Capita Living Expenditures of Urban and Rural Households
 
(RMB)	 5
 
Table 5: Major Tax Incentives for Foreign Invested Enterprises in China's Economic Zones 10
 
Table 6: Foreign Supermarket Firms in China 31
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: GNP Trend 1978-1993 3
 
Figure 2: GNP Growth in % 3
 
Figure 3: Supermarket Status: Four Cities-1994 27
 
Figure 4: Supermarket Status: Beijing-1994 27
 
Figure 5: Supermarket Status: Shenzhen-1994 27
 
Figure 6: Supermarket Status: Shanghai-1994 27
 
Figure 7: Supermarket Status: Guangzhou-1994 27
 
•
 
v
 
Introduction 
China's 1.2 billion population is an enormous attraction to many retailers and 
manufacturers of consumer products that have begun to vie for this huge potential market. 
Not only does the number of consumers continue to grow, but China's economy has 
experienced an impressive growth since its reform in 1978. China's GNP grew 10 percent 
or more during the early 1990's. This figure is especially impressive when compared 
with the rest of the world which was facing an economic downward trend. Also, per­
capita income rose at an average rate of 10.8 percent since 1990. Chinese consumers can 
now afford a better quality of life with an increase in consumption.of both necessary and 
luxury products. However, the old system of centrally controlled distribution and 
retailing can no longer cope with the increasing consumption rates under the new market 
economy. This increasing demand has provided the proper environment as well as strong 
incentives for developing new supermarkets as part of China's retail industry. Since the 
late 80's and early 90's, in order to stay competitive locally as well as globally, many 
Western and Asian retailers have actively explored opportunities in China hoping to 
capture as much market share as possible in this attractive and dynamic market. 
China has been undergoing many transitions including its economic system, social 
structure, consumption habits, etc. It is this dynamic nature of China that makes national 
growth rates or income numbers insufficient in understanding the retail market as a 
whole. Therefore, this paper will attempt to provide the reader with an understanding of 
the issues regarding China's population, economic growth and development, purchasing 
power, development of the new wealthy, and new economic zones as a background for 
retail development. Next, the paper will address: 
ean overview of the economy
 
ewhat defines a supermarket in China
 
ethe stages of development in the supermarket industry
 
edevelopment in three key regions of China
 
egovernment involvement
 
esummary of operational performance from store surveys
 
eissues facing supermarket development in China
 
eanalysis of data on four major cities from retail census
 
Finally, the paper will provide concluding remarks on the prospects and 
recommendations for future supermarket development in China. 
Population 
Historical Overview ­
Population has not always been an issue of concern in China. When the People's 
Republic of China was formed in 1949, its population was 541.67 million people. China 
experienced two peaks in population growth during the periods of 1950-1957 and 1962­
1971. These two population surges could be a result of a series of macroeconomic 
policies after the establishment of the PRC government and lack of proper government 
guidance during the cultural revolution. By 1969, China had a population of 806.71 
million people. Since the 1970's, the central government began to realize the negative 
impact that the enormous population imposed on the economic growth of the country, 
and a series of birth control and planned parenthood policies were implemented. Since 
then, the birth rate declined until it hit its lowest point in 1984. However, the babies born 
during the second population peak reached child bearing age around 1986 and, once 
again, the nation was faced with another population crisis. This remnant effect wil11ike1y 
last until late 1990's. 
Trends in the 90's 
Rigorous enforcement of the one-child policy for over a decade has to affect 
population patterns. According to the 1994 Statistical Yearbook of China, the population 
was slightly greater than 1.18 billion in 1993, or about one-fifth of the world's 
population. About 28 percent of the population dwelt in urban areas and 72 percent in 
rural areas. China's population was 1.192 billion in 1994. Since 1990, the population has 
maintained a steady annual growth rate of about 1.1 percent, which is equal to about two­
thirds of the entire population of Australia. According to the US Bureau of the Census, 
the projected Chinese population could reach 1.26 billion by the year 2000. 
In 1994, China's largest population segment was between the ages of 20 and 29 
and was born during the second population peak between 1962-1971. This large number 
of shoppers has sizable consumer clout. They are young and eager to make the transition 
to consumption habits that will create a demand-driven retail market. This mass of young 
consumers, especially the urban dwellers, form a great market for services that retailers 
can provide. On the other hand, as China's population is aging rapidly and as social and 
family supports have given way, the economic conditions of the elderly group have 
worsened. Rapid inflation is eroding fixed pensions and health care established under the 
old communist system. In 1994,6 percent of the population was over age 65. 
Economy 
Growth and Development 
Growth in China's economy has been very impressive following the country's 
economic reforms which have been occurring since 1978. During each of these past 17 
years, the gross national product (GNP) has exceeded 4 percent. During about half of 
those years the GNP exceeded 10 percent. By 1993, China's GNP was more than ten 
times the size of its GNP in 1978 (Figure 1). However, this tremendous growth in the 
economy took place during the reform period when corrective measures created a series 
of boom-bust cycles. From Figure 2, we observed that 1981, 1986, and 1990 are at the ­
low points of the cycle due to corrective measures established to cool down an overheated 
economy. Even with the continuing fluctuation of the growth rate, it appears China could 
achieve an average annual GNP of about 8-10 percent for the remainder of the century. 
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Figure 1 GNP Trend 1978-1993 Figure 2 GNP Growth in % 
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China's economy is difficult to compare to international measures such as US 
dollars. Using the official exchange rate, China's per capita GDP increased from US$259 
in 1981 to US$370 in 1990 which is hardly consistent with an average annual per capita 
growth rate of over 8 percent experienced in the 1980's in terms of yuan. The official 
exchange rate may be misleading due to the significant depreciation of the Chinese yuan 
over the past 15 years and also due to the difficulty in determining the prices of goods and 
services in non-tradable sectors. 
Per-Capita Income 
National income in China has grown from 301 billion (unit of Chinese currency 
(RMB) in 1978 to 2,488 billion RMB in 1993 (see Table 1). Based on comparable prices 
of consumer goods, national income has increased by 377 percent in 15 years and the 
annual growth rate averaged 10.8 percent since 1990. In 1992 and 1993, income grew by 
more than 15 percent compared with the previous year (see Table 1). 
Table 1
 
National Income, Index of National Income and National Income Growth
 
(1978-1993)
 
Annual National 
National Income Index of National Income* Income Growth** 
Year (1 billion RMB) (1978=100) (%) 
1978 301.0 100.0 12.3 
1980 368.8 113.9 6.4 
1985 702.0 183.2 13.5 
1990 1,438.4 263.7 5.1 
1991 1,655.7 284.0 7.7 
1992 2,022.3 327.7 15.4-
1993 2,488.2 377.2 15.1 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1994 
*based on comparable prices 
**compared with the previous year 
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The income level of both urban and rural Chinese residents has increased, 
although actual income levels of rural Chinese are still far below those in urban areas. 
Per-capita income of rural residents increased from 134 RMB in 1978 to 922 RMB in 
1993 which, when deducting the inflation factor, resulted in an actual annual increase of 
5.9 percent and an overall increase of 338.6 percent over the 15 years. Per-capita income 
of urban residents increased from 316 RMB in 1978 to 2,337 RMB in 1993, which was 
an overall increase of 251.6 percent and an annual increase of 6.3 percent when the price 
factor is deducted (see Table 2). 
Table 2
 
Annual Per-Capita Income of Rural and Urban Residents
 
(1978-1993)
 
Year Income of Rural Residents Income of Urban Residents 
Net Annual Income Index Net Annual Income Index 
1978 133.6 100.0 316.0 100.0 
1980 191.3 138.1 439.0 127.0 
1985 397.6 261.2 685.3 161.6 
1990 686.3 300.7 1,387.3 197.8 
1992 784.0 328.1 1,826.1 228.3 
1993 921.6 338.6 2,336.5 251.6 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1994 
Greater income has not only boosted the purchasing power of the Chinese people, 
but also increased of their savings (see Table 3). The balance of saving deposits of rural 
and urban residents has risen from 21.06 billion RMB in 1978 to over 1,520 billion RMB 
in 1993, while the average per-capita saving deposit balance has also increased from 
about 22 RMB in 1978 to 1,283 RMB in 1993 (see Table 3). 
Table 3
 
Total and Per-Capita Saving Deposit Balances of Chinese Residents
 
(1978-1993)
 
-

Year Savings Deposit Balance of 
Rural and Urban Residents 
(1 billion RMB) 
Average Per-capita Saving 
Deposit Balance 
(1 RMB) 
1978 21.06 21.88 
1980 39.95 40.47 
1985 162.26 153.29 
1990 703.42 615.24 
1992 1,154.54 985.35 
1993 1,520.35 1,282.81 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1994 
4 
Components of Expenditure 
More than 70 percent of an average Chinese citizen's household expenditures in 
both urban and rural areas was spent on food, clothing and general merchandise (see 
Table 4). Spending on food accounted for more than half of the annual household 
expenditures and was far larger than spending for other goods. Many staple foods as well 
as housing expenditures are subsidized by the government. Health care is also subsidized 
by the government. Expenditures for medical care average only 3 percent per Chinese 
household. Chinese citizen's spending on education and recreation is the third ,largest, 
category of expenditures. In 1993, 7.6 percent of the average rural household's total 
consumption went for education and recreation, compared with 9.2 percent for the 
average urban household. The ordinary Chinese family does not commonly own an 
automobile or telephone, and since public transportation is very inexpensive, only 3 
percent of the average Chinese household's total living expenses in 1993 were spent on 
transportation and communications (see Table 4). 
Table 4
 
1993 Annual Per-Capita Living Expenditures of Urban and Rural Households
 
(RMB) 
Livinsz Expenditures 
Per-Capita Rural 
Household 
Per-Capita Urban 
Household 
Value % Value % 
Food 446.83 58.0 1,058.20 50.1 
Clothing 55.33 7.2 300.61 14.2 
General Merchandise 44.67 5.8 184.96 8.8 
Residence 106.79 13.9 140.01 6.6 
Health care 27.17 3.5 56.89 2.7 
Education and 
Recreation 
58.38 7.6 194.01 9.2 
Transportation and 
Communication 
17.41 2.3 80.63 3.8 
Others 13.07 1.7 95.50 4.5 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1994 
The New Wealthy and Purchasing Power 
Is per capita income a realistic guide when examining China's potential consumer 
market? According to the Statistical Yearbook of China, annual per capita income of 
urban Chinese households in 1993 was $453US, and rural households was $161.7US. 
Field Force Integrated Marketing Solution Group, a Taiwan based marketing consulting 
firm, conducted the Consumer Behavior Research in Mainland China 1994 in Beijing, 
-

Shanghai, and Guangzhou. According to this research, in 1993, per-capita income of 
Beijing residents was $840US, income of Shanghai residents was $1052US, and income 
of Guangzhou residents was $1,431 US (7). These figures were ·about twice the official 
figures in these three cities. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund reported 
Chinese per-capita income at about $2,OOOUS in terms of purchasing parity (2). This 
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figure took price level into consideration and illustrated that about $2,OOOUS value of 
merchandise can be purchased in China with about $5OOUS of per-capita income. A 
recent report by management consultants, McKinsey and Company suggests that 
consumer spending for luxury items is triggered at the per capita annual GNP threshold of 
$lOooUS. According to the Statistical Yearbook, China has five cities that exceed this 
threshold -- Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. The Hong Kong 
Trade Council estimates that 16 cities will be among this elite by the year 2000. 
In the course of gathering data for this paper, it was learned that the Chinese 
government imposes a limit on workers' wage level, and if workers are paid above this 
set limit, employers will be taxed or fined. To avoid these taxes, workers are often 
compensated with consumer products rather than with higher wages. According to a 
supermarket retailer in Shenzhen, it is a common practice among employers in China to 
purchase daily necessities in bulk several times a year and distribute them to workers as a 
form of a 'bonus'. For example, some of the more widely accepted bonuses are the 
'summer cooling fee' and 'winter warming fee' etc. It is evident that reported incomes do 
not reflect actual purchasing power as bonuses in the form of food products drive down 
the cost of living for the average Chinese citizen, and much income goes unreported. 
The number of well-off Chinese is growing in spite of the low income reported 
per capita. Not surprisingly, most of them reside in the Special Economic Zones and in 
the coastal cities. This group of new wealthy consumers have a comparatively high level 
of disposable income and thereby has substantial purchasing power. This class of new 
wealthy can be categorized as follows: 
1.	 Entrepreneurs of private business. Since the economic reform, there has been a 
growing trend in establishing private business among able individuals. This 
trend has been especially evident in the Special Economic Zones (see next 
section) and in the coastal cities. These entrepreneurs generally have 
substantial wealth. 
2.	 Managerial personnel of foreign business. These local Chinese managers are 
very well paid for their ability to establish foreign businesses in the local 
market. However, wages are still low compared to, for example, the 
managerial wages in Hong Kong. 
3.	 Personnel serving in a special trade. Interviews with taxi drivers in China 
indicated that a substantial portion of the money they receive is never reported 
as income, since they are paid in cash and receipts are not requires.. Also, 
sales representatives and buyers have sizable incomes from commissions 
on sales or remittance from suppliers in addition to the salary that in most 
­cases goes unreported. 
4.	 Leaders of profitable government-owned organizations. Profitable operations 
provide ample 'public accounts' for various expenses enjoyed by leaders and 
workers of that organization. 
6 
5.	 Opportunists. These are clever individuals who take advantage of China's 
economic system in transition using their well established 'guan xi' or human 
resource relations. 
This group of well-off Chinese has abundant income and possesses the purchasing 
power which has the greatest impact on the retail industry. They will be leaders in the 
development of Chinese consumer trends. Since time is becoming more valuable, they 
tend to shop mostly during weekends or holidays. Also, they demand better quality 
products and the clean, pleasant shopping environment that the supermarket provides. 
The New Economic Zones·- Windows to the Outside World 
Many economic zones with different incentive conditions were established in 
China soon after its sweeping economic reform in 1978. These economic zones serve as a 
mechanism for opening China's market to the outside world and as an example for 
guiding the economic development of the entire country. The objective of these 
economic zones is to allow market forces to work by helping increase the productivity 
and efficiency of the economy within the socialist market economy framework. These 
new economic zones include: Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Open Coastal Cities, 
Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZs), Open Coastal Economic 
Areas, Pudong New Development Area, Free Trade Zones (FTZs), and other areas. 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
In 1980, the four cities in southern China that became the SEZs were Shenzhen, 
Shantou, and Zhuhai in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian province. The 
Hainan Island was elevated to provincial status and designated the fifth SEZ in 1988. 
The SEZs were given unprecedented special privileges, as compared to the inland cities, 
including preferential tax policies for foreign joint ventures and have considerable leeway 
to approve foreign investment projects at the local level (see Table 5). The SEZs have 
been established to: 
1.	 attract foreign investment in all sectors of the economy including retail 
industry, 
2.	 keep in pace with the trends and activities in the international markets 
3.	 expand export trade, and 
4.	 facilitate participation in the international business and technological 
cooperation. 
The SEZs are the obvious cities of entry for many foreign retailers such as Yaohan,
 
Welcome, Park-N-Shop and Wal-Mart. 
­
Open Coastal Cities 
In 1984, fourteen Open Coastal Cities were established. They consisted of Beihai, 
Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Qingdao, Qinghuangdao, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Wenzhou, Yantai, and Zhanjiang. These cities were granted greater 
7
 
autonomy to approve contracts and offer special incentives, such as capped land use fees, 
tax exemptions, and tax holidays (Table 5). The scope of the permitted operations in the 
Open Coastal Cities is very similar to that of the SEZs. Each city was allowed to establish 
an Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ) to offer further tax 
reductions and holidays outside the city core (Table 5). Since 1992, many major foreign 
retailers including Yaohan, Park-N-Shop, Carrefour, Makro, and others have set up joint 
venture operations in Guangzhou and Shanghai. 
Open Coastal Economic Areas 
In 1985, China decided to further expand the open coastal areas extending the 
entire section of the country into an open coastal belt. These areas consisted of Pearl 
River delta and the area surrounding Guangzhou; the Yangtze River delta around 
Shanghai area including Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou in Jiangsu Province, Jiaxing and 
Huzhou in Zhejiang Province; and the Southern Fujian-Min River delta including 
Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou in Fujian Province. In 1988, the Shandong and 
Liaoning peninsulas were added extending the Open Coastal Economic Area to more than 
260 cities and counties in China. These areas offer similar incentives to that of the Open 
Coastal cities (Table 5). These areas are designed to integrate the high-growing export 
oriented production industries of the coastal cities with raw material and component 
productions in the interior cities. Obviously, the rapid economic development in these 
Open Coastal Economic Areas will provide favorable conditions for developing retail 
industries in these areas. 
Pudong New Development Area 
In 1990, Pudong New Development Area was established to attract foreign 
investments with less stringent regulations and more economic incentives. The 350 sq. 
km zone is located on the eastern bank of the Huangpu River, facing Shanghai on the 
other side of the Huangpu River. It is the government's intention that Pudong will serve 
as a leader in promoting economic activities for cities further up the Yangtze River and 
hasten the pace of reform in the Yangtze Delta region. Also, Pudong is vital in turning 
Shanghai into an international economic, financial and trade center. Pudong receives 
many similar economic incentives as the SEZs (Table 5). However, the government has 
extended special preferential policies to the Pudong New Development Area which are 
not enjoyed by the SEZs. For example, foreign companies can set up financial 
institutions, department stores, supermarkets, and other tertiary enterprises in Pudong 
without involving a local partner. Pudong itself is subdivided into four zones namely 
Lujiazi Financial and Trade Zone, Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, Waigaoqiao Free 
Trade Zone, and the Zhangjiang High-Tech Park. Over 4000 industrial sites are currently 
under construction in Pudong. 
• 
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Free Trade Zones (FTZs) 
As of June 1994, thirteen Free Trade Zones have been established and they are 
Dalian, Futian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shantou, Shantoujiao, 
Tianjin, Xiament, Waigaoqiao, and Zhangjiagang. The FTZs are small special district 
with closed access facilities allowing duty and tax free import and processing of goods for 
export. FTZs also allow foreign trading, banking, and insurance companies to set up 
operations in their boundaries. Foreign investors in FTZs are eligible for many similar 
benefits available to SEZs or ETDZs (Table 5). 
Other Economic Zones 
Since 1992, the government has established many more special economic zones 
including 52 high-tech industrial development zones, 18 open provincial or regional 
capital cities, 11 State tourism and holiday zones, 13 open border towns. These zones are 
authorized to extend preferential policies on par with the open coastal cities (Table 5). 
•
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Table 5
 
Major Tax Incentives for Foreign Invested Enterprises in China's Economic Zones
 
Nationwide 
Mfg. Income Tax 30% 
Rates 
Non-mfg. Service 30% 
Industry Tax Rates 
Service industry No nationwide 
investing over $5 exemptions 
million with terms 
of at least 10 years 
Foreign Joint 30% 
Venture Banks or 
Branches 
(investing at least 
$10 million for at 
least 10 years) 
Income Tax Rates 15% in any year, if 
for Enterprises they export more 
Certified as Export than 70% of their 
Oriented or output 
Technologically 
Advanced 
Income Tax 40% tax refund 
Refund for FIEs paid on profits 
with Reinvested reinvested or used 
Profits to establish other 
enterprises for the 
last 5 years 
Local Income Tax Generally 3% 
Rates (10% of national 
tax rate), but often 
waived by the 
locality 
Dividends, 10% for US 
Interest, and other companies 
Non-earned 
Income 
Repatriation of 10% 
profits 
SEZs 
15% 
15% 
Tax exempt for the 
first profit making 
year, followed by a 
50% reduction for 
the next 2 years 
(7.5% tax rate) 
15%, but tax 
exemption for the 
first profit making 
year, followed by 
50% reduction for 
the next 2 years 
10% upon the 
expiry of income 
tax exemption for 
an export oriented 
enterprise; 
technologically 
advanced FIEs 
qualify for 50% 
reduction for 3 
years after expiry 
of exemption 
(7.5% rate) 
Same as 
nationwide 
0%, however 
subject to locality 
10% 
Exempt 
ETDZs 
15% 
15% 
Same as SEZs 
30% for bank's 
representative 
offices; 15% for 
bank's branches 
approved by the 
State Council 
Same as ETDZs 
Same as 
nationwide 
Same as SEZs 
Same as SEZs 
Same as SEZs 
PudongNew
 
Development
 
Area
 
15% 
15% 
Same as SEZs 
15% 
Same as ETDZs 
Same as 
nationwide 
Same as SEZs 
Same as SEZs 
Same as SEZs • 
•. 
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Table 5 continued 
Mfg. Income Tax 
Rates 
Open Coastal 
Cities (14 cities) 
24%, but 15% if 
FIE is 
technologically 
advanced, 
investing at least 
$30 million, or 
High-Tech Zones 
(52 areas) 
15%, but must be 
approved as high­
tech enterprises 
Free Trade Zones 
(13 FTZs) 
15%, but rates are 
subjected to 
locality 
Open Coastal 
Economic Areas 
(260 cities & 
counties) 
24%, but 15% if 
FIE is 
technologically 
intensive, investing 
at least $30 
million, or 
investing in 
transportation or 
harbor industries 
investing in 
energy, 
transportation, or 
harbor industries 
Non-mfg. Service 24% 30% 15%, but rates 24% 
Industry Tax Rates subject to locality 
Service industry Same as ETDZs Same as ETDZs Same as ETDZs Same as ETDZs 
investing over $5 
million with terms 
of at least 10 years 
Foreign Joint 15%, but rates are Same as Open Same as Open Same as Open 
Venture Banks or subject to approval Coastal Cities Coastal Cities Coastal Cities 
Branches by State Tax 
(investing at least Administration 
$10 million for at 
least 10 years) 
Income Tax Rates 
for Enterprises 
Certified as Export 
Oriented or 
Technologically 
Advanced 
12% in any year if 
FIE exports more 
than 70% of their 
output; 
technologically 
advanced FIEs 
qualify for 50% 
reduction for 3 
years after the 
expiry of 
exemption (12% 
rate) 
Same as ETDZs Same as ETDZs Same as Open 
Coastal Cities 
Income Tax Same as Same as Same as Same as 
Refund for FIEs nationwide nationwide nationwide nationwide 
with Reinvested 
Profits 
Local Income Tax Same as SEZs Same as SEZs Same as SEZs Same as SEZs 
Rates 
Dividends, 
Interest, and other 
Non-earned 
Income 
Same as SEZs NA NA NA 
• 
Repatriation of 
profits 
Same as SEZs NA NA NA 
Source: Compiled by Piper Lounsbury from US-China Business Council Files 
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Supermarket Development in China
 
Supermarkets in China 
In China, where the concept of the supermarket is still emerging, there is no clear 
definition of what type of retail store constitutes a supermarket. The concept is still so 
new to consumers as well as to retailers and suppliers that many sizes and types of stores 
now fall under the umbrella of this definition. Most of the stores classified as 
supermarkets are small by comparison to industry standards in other countries. It is quite 
common to define a self-service store of 100 square meters as a supermarket. In most 
other Asian countries as well as the United States, convenience stores are typically larger 
than 100 square meters and supermarkets are usually 1,000 square meters or larger. 
The fact that stores as small as 100 square meters are included in the definition of 
supermarkets in China may be due to the urban nature of their development as well as to 
the fact that many new "supermarkets" are simply conversions of old stores that 
previously offered only clerk service. By introducing self-service shelving, these stores 
are arbitrarily proclaimed to be supermarkets. 
For consumer goods to effectively reach the market, there must be an adequate 
distribution system as well as appropriate retail stores. China's distribution system is 
undergoing enormous change, and its retail stores are still in the very early stages of 
development. The self service supermarket is truly a new concept to the Chinese 
consumer. 
How is the supermarket perceived by the average Chinese shopper? It is a store 
with a wide selection of foreign packaged food products. It is a clean store that features 
self-service shopping. And it is still somewhat of a novelty where consumers shop 
infrequently or on special occasions. It may be easier to describe the supermarket by 
explaining what, to Chinese consumers, it is not. It is not the place consumers go to buy 
their basic food needs - such as rice, grains, cooking oil, or fresh fruits and vegetables. 
These products are purchased at the wet market or from small neighborhood shops. The 
supermarket is not the lowest priced food store for consumers. Bargains are to be found 
in the wet markets and neighborhood stores which often have lower prices due to very 
low overhead. 
Low income consumers would probably never shop in a supermarket because the 
products would be considered luxury items, or at least somewhat "specialty products". 
Since nearly all rural consumers fall into the low income category, only urban consumers 
would frequent the supermarket and then only for special occasions. 
Will the supermarket become a more common shopping experience for the ­
average consumer in China? The answer is yes. 
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Stages of Development 
Supermarket development in China has proceeded in a very different manner than 
in other countries of the world. History has reported that the first supermarket of record 
was opened in the United States in 1929 in response to the severe economic downturn 
known as the Great Depression. The strategy of this first United State supermarket was 
to offer consumers food at lower prices in a large self-service environment. 
After World War II, the supermarket experienced its greatest growth in the United 
States and its self-service store concept has been widely accepted by other developed and 
developing countries. 
In China, supermarkets are known as self-service stores, and they emerged in the 
early 1980s when the government introduced its first efforts to liberalize the market and 
vitalize the economy. Self-service stores first appeared in China in major cities like 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. These stores, however, did not attempt to attract 
consumers with low prices, like the early supermarkets in the United States, but focused 
on a marketing strategy based on offering consumers a wide variety of products and 
clean, neat stores. Therefore, consumers are lured to supermarkets in China not because 
of any promise of "savings" but because the supermarket offers a wider choice of 
products in a pleasant shopping environment. 
Supermarket development in China from 1981 through 1995 can be divided into 
five major stages: introduction, decline, reintroduction, adjustment and steady growth. (4) 
(8). 
1981-1985: Introduction 
The Guangzhou Friendship Store marked the introduction of the supermarket in 
China. This store, which was opened in 1981 was patterned after typical western 
supermarkets and also reflected the influence of nearby Hong Kong retailers. The store 
was considered a novelty, and there were very few other supermarkets opened during the 
early 1980's. This slow pace of growth in the number of supermarkets lasted for about 
four years until 1985, when a number of retailers began testing self-service stores in 
China. By the end of 1985, there were about 155 self-service stores throughout China. 
Beijing had 51 self~service stores, about one third of China's total, and there were about 
20 self-service stores in Shanghai. 
Self-service stores during this period can be classified into three types in terms of 
capital sources, products, and customers (8): 
1.	 The first type was the supermarket that was solely funded by Hong Kong ­
investors or a supermarket in which Hong Kong investors formed a joint 
venture partnership with Chinese local enterprises. These supermarkets were 
primarily located in cities such as Shenzhen that were near the border of Hong 
Kong. The major customers were foreign travelers from Hong Kong or other 
countries as well as Chinese who returned from living abroad or who 
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possessed foreign exchange certificates. The products found in these 
supermarkets were imported from Hong Kong and consisted primarily of food 
although the stores also sold some general merchandise. In some cases 
supermarkets even had a clothing section. An example of this type of store 
was the Park-N-Shop Supermarket which opened in Sherquo, Shenzhen. 
2.	 The second type of supermarket was owned and operated by local enterprises. 
Their major customers were also foreigners and Chinese who were returning 
from living abroad. Some stores served local Chinese residents as well. Most 
of the products they carried were packaged foods, and some, but not all of 
them, were imported. The Guangzhou Friendship Store, Foreign Trade Center 
Supermarket, and Shipping Foreign Supply Supermarket were examples of 
this type of supermarket. 
3.	 The third type was the self-service supermarket that was also owned and 
operated by local firms. They were located in major cities but in contrast to 
the other types of supermarkets which catered to foreigners, these stores 
served the ordinary Chinese customers. It has been estimated that 90 percent 
of these stores sold only food. Most of the products were locally made 
although some stores also sold a few imported products. 
The stores in Beijing are good examples of the development of self-service stores 
in China during this introductory period. The first self-service store appeared in Beijing 
in 1982. By the end of 1983, the number of self-service stores had reached 20. In 1984, 
another 21 self-service stores opened to bring the total number to 41. By the end of 1985, 
there were 51 self-service stores in total. During this introductory period, the most rapid 
growth of self-service stores occurred between 1984 and the first two quarters of 1985. 
The majority of these self-service stores (6) sold only food and vegetables. The 
stores had refrigerated equipment to keep the foods fresh. Seven of these self-service 
stores were department stores which sold only general merchandise. Six of them sold 
only grains and oils. Most of these self-service stores were small with less than 500 
square meters of total store space. The smallest ones were only about 100 square meters 
in size (4). 
1986-1990: Decline 
Between 1986 and 1990, there were several unfavorable factors in the market 
environment that caused the number of supermarkets to decline and by the end of 1989, 
many supermarkets that had been opened during the introductory period had been closed 
or returned to clerk-service stores. For instance, in Shanghai, the number of supermarkets 
shrank from 20 in 1986 to only one in 1989. This decline, according to Mr. Lee, Shou­
-
Shiang of the Office of Finance and Trade of Shanghai city government, was attributable 
to the following reasons: 
1.	 Lack of product variety: Local suppliers could not meet the needs of 
supermarkets in terms of product quantity, quality, and most importantly, 
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variety. For many supermarkets, the lack of sources of supply was a big 
problem. 
2.	 Shopping habits of Chinese consumers: Because the supermarket was still 
very new to the ordinary Chinese consumer they were not yet comfortable 
shopping in these stores. Their purchasing habits did not include many of the 
products found in supermarkets. Consumers needed more education 
regarding the advantages of shopping in supermarkets to accept this new idea. 
3.	 Lack of professional management skill: Most managers had experience in 
operating traditional clerk-service stores, and when they began to manage 
supermarkets, they found themselves lacking in experience and knowledge. 
4.	 Inappropriate positioning strategy: Many supermarkets positioned themselves 
as high class shopping centers and targeted high income customers; this 
strategy limited the development of the supermarket because of the limited 
number of consumers in this target group. 
5.	 The old structure of the economy was an obstacle: Conflicts between the 
central government and local governments and among regions and 
professions in the old economic structure hindered the expansion of 
supermarkets. In China's original structure of the so called stripe-and-Iump 
economy each of the different professions, or product categories such as 
sugar, tobacco, grain and oil had its single source of supply and a direct 
hierarchical relationship called a strip. This meant that the product was 
distributed straight down from the central organization at the top to the local 
retail shop at the bottom. 
Since supply in China's communist economy has never been sufficient, conflicts 
occurred among regions (called lumps) when they all needed supply from one single 
source. The supermarket compounded this problem because it is a business that requires 
various categories of products. This means that when a supermarket opens a store in one 
region, supplies for other regions must be diverted to the region where the new 
supermarket opened. Also, every profession had its own retail outlets that did business 
directly with the local consumers and the profit was submitted back to the central 
government. When supermarkets entered the market, they took a great deal of sales away 
from these specialty stores. All of these conflicts between the central government and 
local governments and among regions and professions have curtailed supermarkets from 
opening more stores and bringing in products from other parts of the country. The result 
was that supermarkets either could not get approval for opening new stores or could not 
obtain enough sources of supply. 
-
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1991-1992: Reintroduction 
The economy of a society has to be developed to the point where consumers have 
sufficient disposable income to support the supermarket industry. Of all the reasons 
mentioned for the decline of the supermarket industry in the 1980s, the major contributor 
was the weak economic situation in China. The economic situation as measured by 
disposable consumer income was not favorable for the survival of the supermarket during 
the 1980's. 
In the early 1990's, China's economy experienced rapid growth. In 1991, GNP 
grew at the rate of 8.2 percent, double the growth rate of 4.1 percent in 1990. In 1992, 
GNP established a new growth record of 13.4 percent compared with the previous year 
(5). Income level increased more than three times compared to the level ten years ago 
and consumer spending increased at the same rate, providing a favorable climate for 
supermarket development that was lacking during the 1980's. 
Another measure of economic growth that had a posItive influence on 
supermarket development was the fact that more than 95 percent of all households in 
Shanghai now have a refrigerator (1). Many double income families have developed a 
need for a convenient, time saving, one-stop shopping retail outlet that fits into their new 
contemporary life style. 
In addition, improvements in manufacturing technology and communication have 
provided a suitable environment for the development of the supermarket. There is a 
greater variety of products available in the market and more products are packed into 
package sizes that are appropriate for supermarkets 
In May, 1990, China joined the International Association of Bar Code Systems. 
The Shanghai city government also founded the Bar Code Center which required products 
sold in supermarkets to have bar codes on packages in order to allow for scanning in 
supermarkets. Although it may take some time to implement this requirement, both 
foreign and domestic producers began to comply. Computers were also introduced into 
many supermarkets to improve efficiency and to take advantage of the scanning 
opportunity that bar coding provided (8). 
Under these favorable conditions, the supermarket industry experienced its second 
introduction between 1991 and 1992. New stores mushroomed throughout China in 
major and secondary cities. In Shanghai, for example, the rate of growth in the number of 
new supermarket openings was about one store every two to three days. By the end of 
1992, there were about 200 self-service supermarkets in operation in Shanghai (8). 
1993: Adjustment Stage ­
In 1993, a small number of supermarkets withdrew from the market due to 
unsuccessful positioning strategy or bad location. These stores either went out of 
business, moved or merged with other supermarkets. During this period of time, the pace 
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of new store openings slowed as many eXIstmg supennarkets were adjusting their 
operation to better fit the business environment and better serve their customers (8). 
1994-1995: Growth Stage 
By 1994, Chinese customers were becoming familiar with foreign products as 
well as Chinese packaged foods. They also had become more familiar with the 
supennarket concept. By 1994, many Chinese consumers had become experienced 
supennarket shoppers and even developed a one-stop shopping habit.. Supermarket 
executives were learning from experience what operational strategies and tactics were 
most effective in their stores. Social and economic situations had developed to support 
the supennarket industry. Within this positive environment the development of the 
supennarket industry in China entered its steady growth phase in 1994. In Shanghai, 
according to Mr. Lee, Shou-Shiang of the Office of Finance and Trade of the Shanghai 
city government, 133 more new supennarkets were opened during 1994, which increased 
the total number of supermarkets in Shanghai to more than 450. 
Supermarket Development in Three Key Regions of China 
The supennarket industry has developed very differently in various regions of 
China due to different circumstances and local government polices. Between 1990 and 
1994 there appears to be three distinct influences affecting supennarket development in 
three separate regions of the country. 
Southern China -- Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
The Strong Influence From Hong Kong 
Consumer preference of citizens living in southern China has been strongly 
influenced by the geographic proximity of Hong Kong. People living in Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou are aware of many foreign products and brands due to the mass media 
coverage from Hong Kong and will inquire at stores to find out if they carry them. When 
these products find their way into the markets in southern China the prices of these 
products are also affected by the pricing strategy applied in Hong Kong. 
Supennarket Development has been Strongly Influenced by Foreign Investment 
The supennarket industry is becoming increasingly competitive in Southern 
China. Many Chinese retailers are eager to fonn joint venture relationships with foreign 
retailers in order to obtain capital and introduce management and operational expertise 
into their stores. A number of Hong Kong-funded supennarket chains have established a 
retailing presence in southern China. For instance, the Hua-Ren Supennarket Company, ­
with 40 percent ownership from Hong Kong China Resources Purchasing Company Ltd. 
(CRC), had 21 stores in Shenzhen by the end of 1994. Also, Park-N-Shop, a Hong Kong 
supennarket finn, operated 22 stores in Shenzhen in 1994. In· Guangzhou, Wellcome 
Supermarket from Hong Kong was negotiating a joint venture partnership in 1994 with a 
major supermarket company in Guangzhou. 
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Positioning Themselves as High Class Shopping Centers 
Most of the supermarkets in southern China position themselves as up-scale stores 
that offer quality products, better services and nice shopping environments. Therefore 
they do not compete in price and charge more than other nearby small grocery stores. 
Little Government Restrictions or Support 
In principle, local governments throughout southern China encourage the 
development of supermarkets. However, in practice, there is little support from the 
government in terms of incentives and supportive policies. On the other hand, there are 
few restrictions to limit supermarket growth. 
Strong Economy 
Southern China had strong economic growth in the early 1990' s. Guangdong 
province had the highest total value of retail sales (139.970 billion RMB), as well as the 
highest number (44,705) of registered foreign enterprises of any province in China by the 
end of 1993 (5). 
Northern China .. Beijing 
Laissez-Faire 
Although located in the capital city, supermarkets in Beijing do not have many
 
restrictions from the government. Although the government has taken a positive attitude
 
in support of supermarket development, it has offered little financial support.
 
Many Well-Operated Local Supermarkets 
People living in northern China are relatively conservative and they have always
 
had fewer opportunities and less desire to purchase foreign products than people living in
 
the south. This is reflected in the operations of the average locally-run supermarkets. In
 
Beijing, the capital city, many well operated local supermarkets still maintain the style
 
and merchandising approach of traditional Chinese food stores. The majority of their
 
products are locally procured, including fresh meat, sea food, and unique products from
 
different regions of the province.
 
Many Foreign Joint Venture Supermarkets 
•Many foreign enterprises have entered the modem retail market in Beijing. For
 
example, Parkson from Malaysia, Jusco from Japan, and Wellcome from Hong Kong had
 
opened supermarkets in Beijing in 1994 and provided a wide variety of food products for
 
local residents.
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Middle China .. Shanghai 
Guidelines and Policies for Supporting Supermarket Development in Shanghai 
The Shanghai city government has exercised a very strong influence on the 
development of its local supermarket industry. Several guidelines have been set forth by 
the city government in an attempt to establish supermarkets that meet global standards. In 
1991, in order to set an example, the Office of Finance and Trade of the Shanghai city 
government helped to establish the Lianhua Supermarket Company. In 1994, after a 
number of supermarkets went out of business due to unsuccessful positioning strategies 
and poor decisions regarding store location, the Office of Finance and Trade (OFC) 
founded the Self-service Stores Association and took several actions to encourage the 
development of the supermarket (8). For instance, the OFC advertised extensively to 
both the business community as well as to ordinary consumers in an attempt to promote 
the concept of supermarket shopping. They invited academic experts and top 
management personnel to speak to the retailers about new developments in the 
supermarket industry. Also, they sent managers to other countries to study and to emulate 
overseas supermarket operations. In addition, the OFC organized meetings for 
supermarket executives to exchange experiences and develop strategies to improve their 
operations. Furthermore, they conducted a broad survey of the current supermarket 
situation for the purpose of discovering reasons why supermarkets succeed or fail. Based 
on the findings, the OFC established guidelines for the future development of 
supermarkets. Mr. Lee, Shou-Shiang of the Office of Finance and Trade of the Shanghai 
city government, described a number of major guidelines that had been established to 
encourage supermarket development. These included: 
1.	 Ordinary people are the targeted customers of supermarkets. Supermarkets are
 
given the mission from the Shanghai city government to upgrade the average
 
consumers' standard of living. This is reflected in the supermarket's low price
 
approach and in the city government's requirement that supermarkets locate in the
 
suburbs where people live.
 
2.	 A supermarket should be located at the rural-urban fringe, in new residential areas
 
or highly populated areas.
 
3.	 New stores should be at least 500 square meters in size. In 1994, the average size
 
of the 133 new stores that opened in Shanghai was 700 square meters (data
 
obtained from the survey).
 
4.	 New stores are required to have at least 2,500 different products or stock keeping
 
units (SKUs).
 
• 
,.5.	 New stores must carry fresh produce. (Most supermarkets in China in 1994 did
 
not.)
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6.	 New stores are required to have refrigerators for perishable items and freezers for 
frozen products. The amount of the equipment to be determined by the size of the 
store. 
7.	 Computerized systems and chain-like management development were encouraged. 
In order to survive under rigid restrictions as well as take advantage of the 
incentive polices of the city government, many companies are establishing chain 
store management and computerized operating systems to realize the economy of 
scale to control operating costs. 
In addition, the city government has other general guidelines for store hours and 
services, such as selling newspaper and stamps, collecting utility charges, installing 
public phones and micro wave ovens to better serve customers. 
Supporting Policies for Supermarket Development 
The city government also realized that the development of the supermarket truly 
depends on the cooperation and coordination with other industries and professions. 
According to Mr. Lee, Shou-Shiang, the OFC has attempted to coordinate related sectors 
and establish supporting policies: 
1.	 In order to support supermarkets with capital for expansion, the city government 
allocated 100 million RMB to appointed financial institutions as a supermarket 
development fund which would be loaned to supermarket enterprises at a very low 
interest rate. State-owned supermarket companies are provided 2 million RMB, 
one million from the city government interest free (and as some have suggested, 
perhaps repayment free, due to the ambiguity of company ownership) and the 
other one million from the fund through bank loans. The city government, along 
with the district government, has pledged to support half of the interest on the one 
million RMB loan. 
2.	 In helping supermarket expansion, the city government provides rent control by 
putting a ceiling on rent increases. However, if a new store makes a profit within 
the first three years, the real estate department of the city government can double 
the original rent. This is the lowest rate of increase in the rent regulation. 
Normally, rent can be raised up to nine times the original rent,if the company is 
making a profit. 
3.	 Sales tax on grains, oils, and fresh produce will be reimbursed to all supermarkets. 
4.	 Joint ventures enjoy all the same benefits as outlined above for state-owned 
­supermarket companies. The Shanghai city government is taking a positive 
attitude to encourage foreign enterprises to invest in one of three ways: (1) joint 
venture, (2) joint management and (3) cooperation in the entire food marketing 
channel including food manufacturing, processing and wholesaling. So far, only 
joint ventures have been widely used. The other two forms will need more time 
and negotiation. Foreign retailers from many countries have established outlets in 
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Shanghai. Japanese enterprises of Yaohan and Daiei have formed joint venture
 
relationships with different Chinese retailers and planned to have stores in
 
operation in 1995. Ito-yokoto invited Chinese supermarket managers to visit their
 
stores in Japan and plans to open stores in Shanghai. Park-N-Shop from Hong
 
Kong is also expanding its outlets from Shenzhen to Shanghai. Carrefour, a
 
French-based hypermarket retailer, has formed a joint venture with the Lianhua
 
supermarket Company to develop hypermarkets in Shanghai. In general, the city
 
government prefers that the Chinese partner have the majority of the ownership,
 
however, negotiation is possible.
 
Given these incentives and supporting policies, the supermarket industry in 
Shanghai developed steadily in 1993 and 1994. In 1994, 133 new supermarkets opened 
in Shanghai, 33 percent more than planned. These new stores were much larger than 
supermarkets built in the early 1990's and averaged more than 700 square meters in size. 
Product variety has increased and averaged over 3,000 SKUs in 1995. In addition, these 
new supermarkets offer more services than ever before. As a whole, supermarket outlets 
are located more evenly across the city with 90 percent of the stores now located in 
suburban residential areas. The chain store format has been further developed. For 
example, by the end of 1994, Hualian supermarket company had 25 stores, Lianhua was 
operating 24 stores and Triangle had more than 10 stores. Due to the operation of 
multiple stores, economies of scale have been improved. For instance, in 1994, Hualian 
reached a break even point in its operation after one and a half years of losing money. 
The total sales of their 25 stores had reached 200 million RMB (data obtained from the 
survey). 
Although the Shanghai city government is the most supportive government in 
supermarket development, it also places the greatest regulations on supermarket 
operations. In other cities, the local government support is not as strong as in Shanghai, 
and there are fewer incentives from other local governments to foster the newly 
developed industry. 
As of 1994, the supermarket industry in Shanghai was developed more 
extensively than other cities in China. However, when the supporting policies are no 
longer applicable, supermarket companies in Shanghai will have to develop their own 
strategies to survive in the highly competitive market. 
National Government Incentives 
In addition to the regulations set forth by the Shanghai City Government, there are 
a number of special National Government Initiatives that have been important in shaping 
the development of supermarkets in China. Although some of these have been modified • 
(and continue to be adjusted) as retail development continues throughout China these 
initiatives have provided the basis for the direction of supermarket growth from its 
infancy. The following is a list of some of the more important National Government 
Initiatives: 
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1.	 Formalize national development plans for the supermarket industry in China and
 
encourage local governments to provide special support (as in the case of
 
Shanghai).
 
2.	 Permit each of the 14 special economic zones and 6 open cities to establish two
 
joint-venture retailing firms with foreign supermarket companies. (Note: this
 
initial plan has been modified in some areas).
 
3.	 Allocate financial credit for developing supermarket chain store organizations.
 
The purpose of this initiative was to encourage Chinese supermarket companies to
 
develop chain store organizations in order to benefit from the economies of scale
 
that larger organizations afford.
 
4.	 Encourage the training of supermarket managers and employees at home and
 
abroad. The Government encourages joint venture partners from other countries
 
to provide special training outside of China. The Government feels that Chinese
 
managers need to see other supermarket operations and "benchmark" against
 
foreign supermarkets. Therefore, foreign study trips and other types of training
 
abroad are encouraged.
 
5.	 Strengthen communication and information exchanges about supermarket
 
development throughout China. A national supermarket organization was
 
recommended as a means of sharing information between managers. In addition,
 
the Government has recommended newsletters as well as national and regional
 
conferences relating to supermarket activity.
 
The National Government Initiatives have provided the framework for 
development of supermarket organizations in China. Certainly local governments will 
follow the lead of the Shanghai City Government in developing additional guidelines for 
supermarket growth. Should foreign supermarket companies become more dominant it is 
likely that various government agencies will place restrictions on their growth and 
development in order to allow local Chinese firms to establish themselves in the market. 
The Introduction of Foreign Investment 
Since 1992, the municipalities ofBeijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, Guanzhou, Dalian, 
Qingdao, and each of the five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which include Shenzhen, 
Xiamen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Hainan have been allowed to introduce, with the State 
Council's approval, two large foreign-funded retail businesses, although these locally­
approved foreign ventures lack direct import power and must import products through 
their Chinese partners or trading companies (3). • 
During the early 1990's, Hong Kong and Japanese companies have been the first 
foreign entrants in China's newly opened supermarket sector.. Some European and 
American companies have also started to establish outlets in major cities in China. In 
Shanghai, Yaohan International, a Japanese retailer, opened a large department store­
supermarket complex and has announced plans to have 40 conventional supermarkets by 
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the year 2000. Park-N-Shop from Hong Kong had 22 stores in Shenzhen by the end of 
1994 and had started to expand their chain stores in Shanghai. Also in Shenzhen, The 
China Resources Group of Hong Kong had 21 supermarkets and announced plans to open 
another 6 stores in 1995. The Wellcome Supermarket Company from Hong Kong was 
attempting to form a joint venture with a supermarket company in Guangzhou. Walmart, 
the giant discount retailer from the United States, opened its first 2 stores in Shenzhen in 
1995 and also plans to expand into other cities in China. Carrefour, a French 
hypermarket retailer, has signed a contract with Lianhua Supermarket Company of 
Shanghai and has opened two hypermarkets of 4,000 to 5,000 square meters in 1996 
(information obtained from interviews). 
A Summary of the Operational Performance of
 
Supermarkets in China
 
Methodology 
In order to better understand supermarket operations in China, as well as to collect 
specific store operations data, a field study trip was organized. The study trip took place 
in December 1994 and involved visits to nine Chinese supermarket companies in 
Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Foshan, Shanghai, Beijing and Xiamen. The general managers 
had all agreed in advance to share store operating data and to discuss major issues facing 
the supermarket industry in China. 
During each visit the food marketing search team from Cornell interviewed 
General Managers from leading Chinese supermarket companies and asked them to 
complete an extensive survey dealing with the operation of their companies. The survey 
and interviews focused on the issues the companies faced as well as operational 
characteristics of each firm. The following is a summary of these findings: 
Supermarket Size 
There are quite a few small self-service stores in each city. The size of these 
small self-service stores was about 100 square meters. Stores which are classified as 
supermarkets are larger than these small self-service stores, however, even the larger 
supermarkets tend to be much smaller than supermarkets in the United States. The 
average size of these new self-service supermarkets in China was below 300 square 
meters. Those supermarkets opened in 1993 and 1994 have an average size of 300 to 500 
square meters, with some stores as large as 1000 square meters. In 1995, the more typical 
size of a supermarket in China was between 300 and 700 square meters. A self-service 
store of this size was considered to fall within the limits of an acceptable definition of a 
•supermarket by the general managers of the Chinese supermarket companies interviewed 
for this survey. 
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Number of Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) 
The total numbers of SKUs varies quite dramatically between different stores and 
different areas in China. The number of SKUs range from 500 to 7,000. Typical 
supermarkets in China carried between 2,500 and 4,500 items. These products were 
primarily packaged goods, and except for supermarkets in Shanghai and an occasional 
supermarket in Beijing, most supermarkets did not carry fresh fruits and vegetables or 
fresh meat items. Due to the short supply of grocery products, (consumer packaged 
goods) the variety of products Chinese supermarkets carry is not as extensive as in US 
supermarkets. 
Supermarket Sales 
In the United States a self-service food store is defined as a supermarket if it 
generates two million dollars or more in sales per year. Sales per store is a critical 
measure in classifying the store as a supermarket. In China where the supermarket is 
such a new concept, store sales is not used as a criteria for classification of store types. 
Because store size varies widely and because the supermarket is not widely utilized by 
Chinese consumers, there is a huge variation in the average store sales reported by 
supermarket companies responding to this survey. The typical weekly sales range of 
supermarkets operated by companies responding to this survey was 70,000 RMB to 
300,000 RMB, with some firms reporting sales higher then this and some lower. Sales 
vary considerably depending on the location and size of the store. Large stores in highly 
commercialized areas report weekly sales of 500 RMB (or higher) per square meter. 
However, in smaller stores in suburban residential areas, weekly sales can be lower than 
50 RMB per square meter. However, sales growth is very promising for supermarket 
chains due to new store development and consumer acceptance. 
Gross Margins 
The average gross margin for Chinese supermarkets is about 20 percent. In the 
early 1990's, many stores had margins over 20 percent, however, by 1994, supermarket 
companies in general have seen their margins drop to less than 20 percent. For many 
supermarkets, goods are priced according to fixed gross margins. 
Expenses 
The major operating expense for the supermarket companies included in this 
survey was rent, which ranged from a low of 2.8 percent of store sales, to a high of 6 
percent. Most of the respondents to this survey (general managers of supermarket 
companies) indicated that the rent expense for their company would increase over the 
next few years, making it an even more important factor in the overall expenses of the ­
store. Labor, which is typically the largest of all expenses for supermarket companies in 
the United States, ranged from 2 percent of total store sales to 3.8 percent. 
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Net Profit After Tax 
Supermarket fIrms responding to this survey reported net profIts after a 15 percent 
tax rate as high as 4 percent of total sales and as low as a loss of more than 1 percent with 
a typical profIt of about 3 percent of total sales. Several general managers indicated that 
it was very diffIcult to operate a business on a profItable basis, especially in their new 
stores. Some of the companies have been in business for several years and were just 
beginning to show a profIt. 
Supermarket Operating Costs 
Labor cost averaged about 2.5 percent of total sales, much lower than that of 
supermarkets in developed countries. Rental cost was on average 5 percent of total store 
sales. Utilities cost less than 2 percent of total store sales for most supermarkets. The 
cost of shrinkage was less than 0.6 percent of total sales. Among all the causes of 
shrinkage, shoplifting was reported as the most serious problem, and some managers felt 
that it could account for half of the shrinkage loss. 
Grocery Buying and Reordering 
Headquarters buyers have the major control over buying decisions. Some chains 
allow 20 percent of the buying decisions to be made by the store manager. The average 
reordering cycle varies from 20 to more than 50 days, depending on the company's 
inventory strategies and the storage space in its warehouses. 
Capital Component 
Most supermarket chains are solely government owned. However, some Chinese 
supermarket companies are able to obtain a small amount of capital from foreign 
investors. This is expected to change as more large foreign retail companies begin to 
enter the China market and invest more heavily in joint venture opportunities. 
A Summary of Retail Census Analysis of Four 
Major Cities in China 
In 1994, a census was taken of various types of retail stores in a number of major 
,.	 
cities throughout China by the Survey Research Group (now part of A.C. Nielsen) of 
Hong Kong. In this census retail supermarkets were placed in four categories: (1) large 
western supermarkets (lOl-499m2), (2) large Chinese supermarkets (lOl-499m2), 
(3) traditional supermarkets (100 m2), and (4) super grocery supermarkets (500m2). To 
be classifIed as a supermarket the stores had to carry primarily food and grocery products 
­and be self-service. The large Chinese and the large Western supermarkets were 
classifIed as such due to the type of products they carried. These stores appeared only in 
large urban cities which may have contributed to their small size ,.- given the diffIculty in 
securing retail space in Chinese cities. Also, the stores may have been small in this early 
stage of development because of the fact that they were converted from retail space that 
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had previously been used for traditional service grocery stores. The traditional service 
grocery store was a prime target for supermarket development because of its good 
locations, and customers were in the habit of buying food and grocery products from that 
location. 
In this study, four large Chinese cities were analyzed in terms of the development 
of supermarkets. The cities were: Shenzhen and Guangzhou in the south, Beijing in the 
north and Shanghai on the coast. 
In 1994, the Survey Research Group (SRG) census of China indicated that there 
were 1,002 supermarkets in these four cities (see Figure 3). Large Western supermarkets 
accounted for the largest number of stores with 664 and traditional supermarkets were 
second with 194. There were 86 large Chinese supermarkets and 58 super grocery stores, 
500m2 or larger in size. 
Beijing had the most supermarkets of the four cities with 418 and Shanghai was 
second with 408 (see Figures 4 and 5). In both of these cities the most dominate type of 
supermarket was the large Western. Shanghai had more super grocery stores with 31. 
In both Shenzhen and Guangzhou the traditional supermarket was the most 
common (a store about 100m2) with the large Western supermarket second in total 
numbers (see Figures 6 and 7). 
Issues Facing Supermarket Development in China 
Lack of Capital for Expansion 
Due to the lack of capital, Chinese supermarket companies have problems in 
expanding their outlets to achieve economies of scale. In Shanghai, for example, there 
are a number of small food stores as well as grain and oil stores that would provide 
excellent locations for the establishment of supermarkets. Since many of these stores 
have been loosing money for a number of years, they would be eager to join with 
supermarket firms to improve their sales and profits. Supermarkets that take over these 
stores and sign a contract of joint management are required to pay rent and compensation 
for the use of the stores, and they also have to employ the workers from the original 
stores. Short term contracts of less than 10 years are usually allowed, however, once the 
contract is expired, there is no guarantee that it will be renewed. 
Supermarkets established in the form of joint management need capital of at least 
3 million RMB for big stores and 1.5 million RMB for small stores not including the 
additional 300 thousand to 1.5 million RMB for decoration, shelving and equipment. 
Many supermarkets have experienced problems in expanding their business because of ­
the lack of capital. For example, Shanghai Lianhua Supermarket Company needed to 
invest 5 million RMB in a store of 500 square meters. In 1994, they had a debt of about 
20 million RMB and were paying interest of about 2 million every year (8). Lianhua has 
established a joint venture with Carrefour, a French retail company, which will provide 
needed capital for growth and expansion. 
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Hard to Find Store Locations 
Rent in urban and suburban areas of China increased during the early 1990's 
because many new businesses were springing up. Supermarkets found it very difficult to 
compete with businesses such as banks and real estate companies in seeking new store 
locations due to the supermarket's low profit structure. Many other enterprises can afford 
to pay higher rent than supermarkets. 
Poor Return on Investment 
Most Chinese supermarkets report that it will take 3 to 5 years for a supermarket 
to become profitable. Most supermarkets in China are still in their very early phase of 
operation. In Shanghai, very few supermarkets were making a profit in 1994. One 
supermarket general manager estimated that a chain must have 14, stores of 300 to 500 
square meters to break even and at least 16 stores to achieve the economies of scale in 
order to become profitable. Since very few chains have this number of stores it is 
difficult for the supermarket industry in Shanghai to operate at a profitable level, at least 
in the short run (8). 
Lack of Management Know-How 
Since the supermarket is relatively new to Chinese retailers, many supermarket 
executives are not willing to adopt new ideas in the to operation of their stores, and the 
old system and structure is not suited to a market driven economy. For instance, before 
supermarkets became chain organizations, store's purchasing personnel took the full 
responsibility for buying. Their job was considered a lucrative position because they 
often received payment from manufacturers under the table. As the store transformed to a 
member of a supermarket chain, it also had to adopt the supermarket's chain buying 
system in which buying decisions were no longer made by store personnel but by the 
purchasing committee at the chain headquarters. The store employees that previously did 
the buying now view the central buying group as encroaching on their duties. 
On the other hand, headquarters executives are not well informed in modem chain 
operations. They do not have experience in buying a wide variety of products and 
managing more than one store. They also have difficulties recruiting people who have 
experience and knowledge in supermarket operations. Senior managers from the old 
system are often very reluctant to .accept· new ideas. Without new ideas and 
merchandising methods, training managers and employees find it difficult to be effective 
(4) (8). 
Lack of Product Variety 
In many supermarkets in China, shelf space is not fully utilized. Supermarkets are 
eager to obtain a wider variety of products. However, local manufacturing technology of 
packaged foods and products has not caught up with the demand. 
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Ineffective Buying Practices 
Buyers of food and grocery products lack information in finding product sources 
and often procure products indirectly from middlemen at less competitive prices. Also, a 
common problem facing new supermarket companies is that buyers frequently accept 
under the table payments from suppliers who are seeking special arrangements, such as a 
favorable display location. (information obtained from the interview with Mr. Liou, 
President of Guangdong Foods). 
Inefficient Distribution and Unreliable Delivery 
Many supermarket chains do not have distribution centers. A great deal of 
inefficiency may occur in delivery. China's inferior transportation system is also a 
serious problem leading to shipping delays and unpredictable lead time. Because of 
traffic jams and poor refrigeration facilities, many perishable products such as frozen 
foods are either out of stock or they deteriorate in quality on route to the store. 
Lack of Effective Inventory Management 
Traditionally, grocery store managers used their experience to manage inventory. 
When their stores transformed to supermarkets, they lacked experience in handling a 
large number of products. Some supermarkets have introduced computer systems to 
assist with inventory control, yet their computer software is either out of date or seldom 
utilized (information obtained from the interview with Mr. Liou, President of Guangdong 
Foods). Because of poor inventory control, many products are left on display past their 
expiration date, resulting in poor quality products being sold to customers. 
However, one of the most serious problems is irregular group purchasing by state­
owned enterprises. State enterprises are supposed to follow the regulations in giving cash 
bonuses to their employees by paying a tax on the bonus to the central government. In 
order to avoid paying this tax, many state enterprises substitute food products for cash 
bonuses. They buy large amounts of food products from a supermarket as a substitute for 
an employee bonus or to subsidize their regular salary. This kind of transaction often 
happens on special holidays and creates an out of stock situation for the supermarket. 
Since this activity is designed to avoid paying taxes, it is prohibited. Supermarkets can 
not have contract agreements with these enterprises in order to plan ahead for these 
purchases. Because this kind of buying usually involves personal contacts, supermarkets 
that have special relationships with the buying personnel in state-owned enterprises often 
have a greater chance to obtain this business. However, because this kind of business is 
purely built upon personal relationships, the sale will not be guaranteed once the person 
who is in charge of purchasing leaves the job. Supermarkets usually don't have any way 
to acquire and secure this type of transaction, nevertheless, according to Mr. Loo, General 
-

Manager of Hua-Ren Supermarket Company, his supermarket chain has begun to send 
greeting cards to frequent purchasing personnel in state-owned enterprises to remind them 
to come back again. 
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Learning How to Manage a Market Driven Business 
Not having been exposed to a market economy, retailers in China need to learn 
how to employ marketing strategies in response to consumer needs and also to provide 
friendly customer services. 
Shoplifting 
Shoplifting is a problem for many self-service stores, especially the stores located 
in big cities where transient populations come from allover the country to look for jobs. 
Many of these people are very poor and often hungry and have never been exposed to a 
retail store where they can truly touch and handle food products. However, according to 
the Mr. Liou, General Manager of Guangdong Foods Company, employee theft is another 
major cause of products loss in their supermarkets. 
Competition From Traditional Food Outlets 
Chinese people have been shopping for fresh meats and produce at wet markets 
and dry foods and daily necessities at neighborhood grocery stores for hundreds of years. 
They do not believe that the vegetables and fruit in supermarkets are as fresh as in 
traditional wet markets, and they do not think supermarket personnel can be as friendly as 
the small store owners they have known for years. Perhaps most importantly, they can 
not bargain for lower prices at the supermarkets. This deprives them of one of the 
pleasures of shopping. Traditional shops also have lower prices than supermarkets. 
These family-run stores have much lower overhead and fewer facilities. In addition, they 
sometimes carry smuggled foreign products that have avoided high tariffs and therefore 
can be sold at very low prices. 
The Prospects and Recommendations for
 
Future Supermarket Development
 
The management of most Chinese supermarket companies appear to be cautiously 
optimistic about the future of the supermarket in China. One general manager when 
asked how he would grow and develop his supermarket company in the future replied that 
when undertaking a new venture such as the supermarket he would be guided by the old 
Chinese proverb and "cross the river by feeling the stones at the bottom of the river." In 
other words, he would move his company ahead very carefully -- one step -- or one store 
at a time. 
For Chinese supermarket companies to be successful they need management 
know-how -- an understanding of how to meet customer needs and how to manage a 
-

customer oriented work force. Secondly, they need supermarket operational know-how. 
Since the concept is new in China there are very few managers trained in self-service, 
large store, supermarket operations. They need to learn merchandising strategies and gain 
knowledge in day to day supermarket operations (ie, labor scheduling, inventory control, 
space management, buying, pricing, etc.) 
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And finally Chinese supermarket companies will need additional financing if they 
are to grow and be competitive in the market place. One primary source of this financing 
is expected to be from joint ventures with foreign supermarket companies. Local Chinese 
firms can be attractive partners for a foreign supermarket company since they can provide 
important store locations for growth and expansion as well as knowledge of the local 
market. 
In addition, the Chinese companies know the local government officials that will 
have to approve new store locations, issue permits and provide approval for many of the 
activities of the business. 
In 1995, there were over 100 foreign joint venture supermarkets open or planned 
for 1996. Most of the foreign supermarket companies were from Asia, although there 
were also several from Europe (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
, Ch'Forel2n Supermarket F'Irmsm rna 
Company Name Country of Ori2in Cities in China 
Number of 
Stores 
Carrefour France Shanghai 1,5 planned 
China Resource Group Hong Kong Shenzhen 
Guangzhou 
21 
Daiei Japan Tianjin 1 
Jusco Japan Shanghai 
Qingdao 
1 (1996) 
1 (1996) 
Makro Holland GuanJ:?;zhou 1 (1996) 
Metro Germany Shanghai 1 planned 
NTUC Fair Price Singapore Beijing Planned 
Park-N-Shop Hong Kong Shenzhen 
Guangzhou 
Shanghai 
21 
1 
3 
Parksons Malaysia Beiiing 1 
7-Eleven Hong Kong Shenzhen 22 
Watson's Hong Kong Beijing 
Shanghai 
Guangzhou 
3 
2 
1 
Wellcome 
(Dairy Farm) 
Hong Kong Shenzhen 
BeiiinJ:?; 
5 
1 
Yaohan Japan 
Hong KonJ:?; 
Beijing 10 planned 
• 
In 1995, supermarket development in China was in its early introductory stage. 
Many retailers had tried and failed -- many had found ways to "be successful. Chinese 
consumers were still learning about supermarkets, but most had never shopped in one. 
Those that had shopped in supermarkets did not do so on a regular basis -- but only for 
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special occasions. The exception was the "new wealthy" consumer with a higher level of 
disposable income than the average urban consumer. But the growing success of 
supermarkets and the increasing consumer demand for more and better products has set 
the stage for widespread supermarket growth in the major urban centers of China. 
Shanghai appears to be the early focal point of development as indicated by the large 
number of foreign supermarket companies that have targeted that city for new stores. In 
addition, the Shanghai City Government has taken a pro-active stance to encourage 
supermarket growth. There will certainly be a great deal of new store growth over the 
next ten years. However, caution may well be the by-word as firms carefully "cross the 
river, by feeling the stones at the bottom of the river." 
•
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